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was permitted, the instant holding would not affect such an action.
Even if the prospective members can be identified without the aid
of discovery devices,28 the political effort and expense of organizing
such an association may effectively preclude use of this device. Finally,
if state legislation permits, the above-mentioned organization could
sue in its own capacity in federal court without any resort to the
class action requirements. Although it can sue as an entity, no citizen-
ship has been accorded the unincorporated association; 29 citizenship
of each member, therefore, would have to be diverse from that of the
adverse parties-and total diversity in an interstate organization is
rare. Although none of the three options is a cure-all for small claim
litigants, each has its peculiar disadvantage. An application of these
options to the facts of each new case should aid counsel in selecting
the route presenting the fewest difficulties.
Steve Hixson
Cv PNocmuPx-Ci.Ass AcnoN-APPmcAtrrY FOR CoNstMM/Com-
MoN LAw FRAuD.-On July 1, 1969, the Kentucky Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure [hereinafter referred to as Civil Rules] were amended to con-
form to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which had been changed
in 1966. Civil Rule 23, Class Actions, was one of the rules changed.1
On July 3, 1969, a class action was ified in Madison Circuit Court
28 Since the members of the class are often identified by using the discovery
rules after commencement of the action, resort to advertising would probably be
necessary to identify those entitled to join the association-a costly and time
consuming proposition.2 9 8B J. MoonE, FEDEmAL PRncncE ff 23.08, at 2510 (2d ed. 1969).
1 The applicable section to be discussed here is Ky. R. Cv. P. 23.02(3), the
section that followed the old "spurious" class action concept. Ky. R. Civ. P.
23.02(3) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of Rule
23.01 are satisfied, and in addition ... (3) the court finds that the ques-
tions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (a) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (b) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already com-
menced by or against members of the class; (c) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the par-
ticular forum; (d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the man-
agement of a class action.
A complete analysis of Ky. R. Crv. P. 23 is beyond the scope of this comment
and the 23.02(3) provision will be considered as the controlling part of the
rule for this discussion. It should be noted however that other provisions of Ky.
R. Cxv. P. 23 must be satisfied before the 23.02(3) provision becomes an issue.
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against General Motors Corporation. The complaint alleged that
General Motors had fraudulently inflated "sticker prices" on new cars
sold in Kentucky since 1958 and that plaintiff and all other buyers of
General Motors cars since 1958 were injured by this fraudulent
action. $139,000,000 actual damages and $347,500,000 punitive dam-
ages were asked.2 Pursuant to Civil Rule 23.03, a hearing must be
held as soon as practical to determine if the suit should continue as a
class action. The issue to be determined here is whether a class suit
should be maintained in Kentucky for a consumer/common law fraud
action. Dayton v. General Motors Corporation, Civil No. 5693 (Mad-
ison Cir. Ct., Ky., filed July 3, 1969).
The essential elements of common law fraud in Kentucky are ma-
terial representation, falsity, recklessness, intention, reliance, decep-
tion, and injury.3 In order for Civil Rule 23.02(3) to be applicable,
there must be common questions of law and fact which predominate
over questions affecting individual members of the class. 4 It is the
court's responsibility to determine whether a class action in a particular
case is the fairest and most efficient method to employ.5 The common
questions involved in common law fraud brought by a consumer on
behalf of a class would be the representation, falsity, recklessness,
deception and intention of the defendant while the individual ques-
tions would be reliance and injury.0 Thus, the judge is faced at the
outset with the responsibility of balancing the common against the
individual interests and determining whether plaintiff should be per-
mitted to represent the consumer class in his suit. This judicial
hurdle was in the minds of the Advisory Committee which drafted
the 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules:
A fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar
misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class
action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found,
for separate determination of the damages suffered by individu-
als within the class. On the other hand, although having some com-
mon core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class
action if there was material variation in the representations
made or in the kinds of degrees of reliance by the persons to whom
they were addressed.7
2 Lexington Sunday Herald-Leader, July 6, 1969, at 14, col. 5.
3 Scott v. Farmer's State Bank, 410 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1966).4Ky. R. Civ. P. 23.02(3).
5 Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43
F.R.D. 39 (1967).6 Advisory Committees Notes, Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966).
7Id. at 103.
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The new Federal Rule 23(b) (3) found immediate acceptance in
fraud cases involving violations of federal securities regulations. 8
The individual questions of reliance 9 and damages' ° did not keep
the courts from permitting the class actions to continue." Those
questions did, however, require the courts to speculate on what meth-
ods would be employed to deal with them.'2 The problem of how to
prove individual reliance in a class suit has received the most at-
tention and the solutions offered vary from using the devices of split
trials 3 and separate proceedings' 4 to changing the substantive law
of fraud and not requiring reliance.15 While there have been no cases' 6
8 See generally 10 FED. Ruris SEmv.2d 23b.3 (1967); 11 FED. RuLEs SEnv.
2d 23b.3 (1968); 12 FED. RuLEs SEnv.2d 23b.3 (1969).
9 Professor Moore says that individual questions with respect to reliance have
not defeated the class status of fraud cases; that reliance is often one of the
factors remanded to the separate proceedings on individual recovery, and that,
substantively, it may be relatively immaterial once the form of fraud giving rise
to liability is determined. Greater difficulty has been acknowledged where the
representations themselves varied as to different members of the class. 3B J.
MooRE, FEDERAL PRArCE II 23.45[2] (2d ed. 1969).
1' Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The court said:
. .. [D]efendants argue that each member of the class would have to
prove reliance, compliance with the statute of limitations, and damages,
and thus the common questions cannot be said to predominate over those
affecting individual members. To 'acknowledge the defendant's position
at this point would be, in effect, an emasculation of the vitality and
pliability of the amended rule. . . .' The common issues need not be
dispositive of the entire litigation. The fact that questions peculiar to
each individual member of the class may remain after the common
questions have been resolved does not indicate the conclusion that a class
action is not permissible. Id. at 490.
"lEisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
Suits alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
thou gh oft en involving separate considerations of the elements of misrep-
resentation and reliance as they affect individual members, have also
been accorded treatment as class actions under the new rule. Id. at 565.
12 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968). The court said that if
the trial court determines that individual reliance is an essential element of the
proof, it can order separate trials on that particular issue, as well as on the ques-
tion of damages, if necessary.
13 Judge Frankel commenting on the Federal Rule 23 said:
The effective administration of (b)(3) actions will probably require
wide use of the already familiar device of split trials. And I submit
that a lively awareness of this sensible device should serve to postpone
or minimize some of the excessively frightening complications that seem
overwhelming from a threshold view of the case. Frankel, supra note
5, at 47.
14 J. MoORE, supra note 9, ff 23.45.
15 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The feeling of the
majority was that reliance in a stock fraud case is presumed from the fact that
an individual purchased the stock.
Moreover, plaintiffs may not even have to prove individual reliance
-the only issue that may prove troublesome. They are contending that
purchase of Monsanto stock at a price which was affected by defendant's
improper activities constitutes sullicient reliance. Id. at 491.
16 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzo , FEDERAL PRACrICE AN PRocEDuRE § 562
(1961, Supp. 1968).
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dealing with common law fraud in a consumer products situation like
the instant case, the issue did arise in a stock fraud case17 brought
before a federal district court in New York. In dismissing the class
action the court said:
Reliance by each person claiming to be a member of the class
must be proven in... common law fraud actions. Thus, each claim
would turn on whether the particular member of the class ac-
tually relied upon Abele's statement . .. and whether such reli-
ance was reasonable under the special circumstances surrounding
the acts of each plaintiff'i8
Thus, it is questionable whether common law fraud is a proper sub-
ject for a class suit in federal court.19 With the acceptance of secur-
ities fraud class actions in federal courts, 20 what should be Ken-
tucky's approach to the consumer/common law fraud class action?
This question may be answered by considering the following three
points.
First, there are the practical problems that will arise in the admin-
istration of such suits. Professor Moore feels that these challenges
should not defeat a class action unless they are of such a magnitude
that their cost will erase any recovery.21 Perhaps the factual and
evidentiary problems of damages and, in particular, reliance in the
common law fraud class action fall into Moore's category. Consider
Judge Medina's opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin2 in which he
speculated on issues that trial courts would face in determining
whether a class action should proceed. "There may conceivably be
questions of jurisdiction or venue, as well as of demands for a jury
trial."23 If a defendant in a common law fraud case can demand a
jury trial,24 what is to prevent a defendant in a common law fraud
class action from demanding the same procedural right with respect
17 Berger v. Purolator Products, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
18 Id. at 545.
19 See Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Con-
sumer Transaction Problems, 48 BOSTON U.L. Irov. 559 (1968).2 0 There is apparently some difference between securities fraud and common
law fraud other than the obvious federal question involved in the former. See
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962), wherein the court
alluded to this difference:
Sec. 10(b) of the Act of 1934 ... creates a remedy in addition to the
common-law right of action for fraud by describing the proposed con-
duct as unlawful. . . .The statute contemplates a new right of action
for... constructive fraud which grows out of the failure to make a full
and complete disclosure. Id at 23.213B J. MoonE, supra note 9, ff 23.45, at 893.
22 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
23 Id. at 567.24Ky. R. Crv. P. 38.01.
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to damages and reliance.25 While there may be no present answer
for the practical problems that may arise once a class action is com-
menced, proponents of the rule can point to the trial judge as having
the power and authority to fashion a remedy that will solve the prob-
lems.20
The second point is the desirability of allowing a consumer/com-
mon law fraud class action. Granting that solutions to the practical
problems might be formulated by the judge, is this allocation of power
a desirable consequence?27 Certainly the concept of an adversary
system must defer to the initiative of judges burdened with the re-
sponsibility of creating new judicial machinery to handle practical
problems.28 Aside from the undesirable effects of increased judicial
power, there are other consequences which grow from allowing this
type of class action. In its supplemental report, the Committee on
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the Ninth Circuit said in refer-
ence to the amended Rule 23:
Litigation will generally be encouraged; the incentive to settle,
diminished.... Moreover, under the mandate of (b) (3), courts
are empowered to entertain class actions where the common
questions predominate over questions peculiar to individual mem-
bers. Accordingly, the litigation stimulated by a favorable class
judgment may bring to the bar issues involving far more atten-
tion than were questions of damages. Thus to the extent sep-
arate suits would never have been prosecuted, or settled out of
court instead, the courts may find themselves saddled with more
litigation as a result of the proposed changes in Rule 23(a). The
new Rule may make many suits grow where there was just one.29
The consequences of class actions in such a fraud case might make
the action undesirable. But if consumers cannot bring class actions to
25 One solution could be to maintain a separate jury to determine the issues
mentioned and to herd the plaintiffs before it, appointing a commissioner to pre-
side over the proceedings. But considering the number of claims and the time
necessary to try them, the cost of this alternative would be extremely high.
20See Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action
Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L.
REv. 888 (1968).
27justice Black, commenting on the new Federal Rules, said that the amend-
ments place too much power in the hands of the trial judge and that the rules
might almost as well simply provide that class suits can be maintained either for
or against particular groups whenever in the discretion of a judge he thinks it
is wise. Statement by Mr. Justice Black, 39 F.R.D. 272 (1966).
28 116 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 26, at 923. The author asserts that if the
new class action rule is to achieve its full potential as a device for prosecuting
many socially worthwhile suits, a new and consistent attitude by the judiciary
is required. The courts must understand that it is incumbent upon them to
facilitate the bringing of these suits by giving the rules a liberal interpretation.
29 CoMmrrr oN FEAr. Rurus OF CivIL PocmDUPE JunICIAr. CONFER-
xNcE-NNH Cmcurr, SuPPLEmEw R. REPORT, 37 F.R.D. 71, 81 (1965).
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recover from and prevent common law fraud, how can Kentucky
consumers protect themselves? 30
This requirement for consumer protection raises the third point,
whether a need exists for a consumer/common law fraud class ac-
tion in Kentucky.31 The federal courts have recognized that the class
action is not a judicial device but rather an administrative one.32 And
they have apparently felt compelled to enter into some administrative
areas such as securities fraud in order to reinforce whatever admin-
istrative remedy exists. 33 The problems of these actions' practicality
and desirability are skirted in an attempt to redress the consumer's
grievances.34 This may serve the purpose initially, but the concept of
the courts as a collection agency for consumer fraud claimants doesn't
lend itself to a permanent solution to the problem.35 Eventually ad-
ministrative agencies will be developed and consumer protection cases
will be handled by administrative machinery designed for such cases.36
Kentucky would be well advised not to permit class actions in con-
sumer/common law fraud cases, but rather to protect consumers
through legislation and agencies to enforce it.
Judge Cardozo said, "A fruitful parent of injustice is the tyranny
of concepts. They are tyrants rather than servants when treated as
3o Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). This problem
was on Judge Medina's mind in Eisen when he said, "[I]n the present case there
is apparently no public administrative body that could ensure repayment, so the
responsibility must ultimately rest on the judicial system." Id. at 567.
31 The recent Supreme Court case of Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969)
has apparently relegated the Rule 23(b)(3) class action to the state courts by
denying the plaintiffs in that class action case the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts because the individual claims were less than $10,000.
32 Professor Moore points this out when he says:
To an increasing extent, the representative lawsuit under revised Rule 23
has developed into a quasi-administrative proceeding, conducted by thejudge. This departure from the traditional- view of litigation as a strict
adversary proceeding calls for a revised attitude toward the parties and
their advocates. 3BJ. MooRE, supra note 9, at 901.
33 Id. at 766 n. 54.'. . . [One of the primary reasons [for the courts'l liberal
allowance of private securities fraud suits as class actions is the fact that the
SEC itself cannot police all the corporate and security dealers in the country ..
Id. 34 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
35 See 3B J. MooRE, supra note 9, 23.45, at 881 n.5, where Moore says:
Thus, for example, while federal courts probably must assume the burden
for the time being, the impropriety of their operating as collection
agencies for small securities fraud claimants points to the need for a more
appropriate agency to be created. Id.
36 But see Dole, The Emergence of Deceptive Advertising as a Group Tort:
A Possible Consequence of the 1966 Federal Rule Amendment with Respect to
Class Actions, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 661, 682 (1967). The author suggests that
relegation of the policing of deceptive advertising to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and kindred public agencies would be an alternative to a (b) (3) class ac-
tion, but that this approach would make relief contingent on the vagaries of
public budgets and staffs.
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real existences and developed with merciless disregard of conse-
quences to the limit of their logic." 37 The Civil Rule 23.02(3) class ac-
tion is such a concept. It represents an effort by judicial theoreticians
who feel that all social problems can be solved by the courts, to
provide a procedural device to accomplish their purpose. The federal
courts have already begun limiting this class action rule.38 Kentucky
should not pick up the quixotic sword and dash off after the wind-
mills. While there may be instances where a Civil Rule 23.02(3) class
action would be the best method to use, the case of a consumer/com-
mon law fraud is not such an instance.
Lyle G. Robey
37B. CAmozo, Tim PAP-AmoxEs Or LEGAL ScmNcE 61 (1930).38 See note 31 supra.
